Danisz Okulicz

Personal Data

Date of Birth	29 July 1992
Nationality	Polish
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Positions

2019–2022	Assistant Professor Higher School of Economics, Department of Theoretical Economics
2022 - present	Conference Manager for Anual EALE Meeting European Association for Law and Economics

Education

2016–2019	PhD in Economic Analysis (IDEA) Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; Barcelona GSE Supervisor: David Pérez-Castrillo
02/2018–05/2018	Visiting Scholar Northwestern University
2014–2016 09/2015 – 07/2016 01/2015 – 06/2015 09/2014 – 12/2014	Master's in Models and Methods of Quantitative Economics (QEM) Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Université Paris 1 Warsaw School of Economics
2011–2014	Bachelor's in Quantitative Economics and Information Systems Warsaw School of Economics

Presentations

2021	Seminar in Economics and Management (Paderborn Unuversity) GAMES 2020 (Budapest) Networks 2021 (Indiana University) EALE 38th Annual Conference (Universitat Pompeu Fabra and BGSE) HSE and NES Joint Workshop in Microeconomic Theory
2020	Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Game Theory and Management 2020 (HSE, Saint Petersburg), 2nd Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design (Alpen-Adria-University).
2019	44th Simposio of Spanish Economic Association (Universidad de Alicante) QSMS Seminar (Budapest University of Technology) FES Job Market Seminar (Higher School of Economics)
2018	43rd Simposio of Spanish Economic Association (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid); 2018 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society (University of Naples); Warsaw Economic Seminar (University of Warsaw and Warsaw School of Economics); XXXIII Jornadas de Economía Industrial (Universitat de Barcelona); 29th Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory (Hebrew University of Jerusalem *poster*);
2017	5th PhD-Student Workshop on Industrial and Public Economics (CREIP, Reus); PhD Jamboree (Barcelona Graduate School of Economics).

Teaching Experience

Advanced Microeconomics	Fall 2019, Fall 2020, Fall 2021
	Higher School of Economics (Master's Programs 'Applied Economics' and 'Economic Research')
Law and Economics	Fall 2019, Fall 2020, Fall 2021
	Higher School of Economics (Master's Programs 'Applied Economics' and 'Economic Research')
Corporate Finance (TA)	Fall 2018
	Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona (International Doctorate in Economic Analysis)
Game Theory (TA)	Spring 2017
	Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona (International Doctorate in Economic Analysis)
Advanced Microeconomics (TA)	Fall 2016, Fall 2017
	Competition and Market Regulation Master's Program; Economics of Public Policy Master's Program (Barcelona GSE)
Information Economics (TA)	Fall 2016
	Competition and Market Regulation Master's Program; Economics of Public Policy Master's Program (Barcelona GSE)

Master Thesis Supervision

2020	Viacheslav Agamalov *The Influence of Corruption on Adverse Selection in the Labor Market*
	Dzhamila Meylanova *Characteristics of Elected Politicians: Theoretical Approach.*

Other Skills

Software	Stata, Matlab, Python, Latex, Ms Office
Languages	Polish (native); English (fluent); Russian (proficient)

Referee

Journal of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Reference letters

Prof. David Perez-Castrillo	david.perez@uab.cat
Prof. Rosa Ferrer	rosa.ferrer@upf.edu
Prof. Onur Kesten	onur.kesten@sydney.edu.au

Working Papers

Matching Agents to Fighting Clients *(joint with Kemal Kivanc Akoz and Emre Dogan)*
Two sets of clients are pre-matched in (legal, political, etc.) battles. Each client needs help from an agent (candidate, lawyer, etc.). We study the stability of matchings of the form: agent-client $\times$ opponent client-opponent agent. We show that if the clients are of binary type stable matching always exist. We propose a novel notion of comparing assortativity of matchings and show that stable matchings exist for any preference profile if and only if the pre-matching is close to negative assortative and propose a preference domain for which stable matchings are guaranteed to exist. We show that at any stable matching the induced matching between agents need to be less positive assortative than the prematching which suggest that negative assortative matchings of opposing political candidates or lawyers should be more common than positive assortative ones. Stable matchings are always efficient but may not be in the core.

SHOULD LAWYERS LIE TO THEIR CLIENTS? BIASED EXPERTISE IN NEGOTIATION

A plaintiff suffers harm of random value from a defendant. The informed defendant proposes a settlement to the uninformed plaintiff who additionally receives cheap-talk advice from her informed attorney. The attorney can be biased for or against a trial. Small bias against the trial does not change the outcome of the negotiation. Small bias for the trial improves the outcome for the plaintiff. Bias may depend on the contract signed by the plaintiff and the attorney. When the cost of litigation for the plaintiff are large, and the value of the harm is likely to be large a contingency fee contract is signed and the attorney is biased against the trial. Otherwise, an hourly fee contract is signed resulting in bias for the trial. Contracts resulting in no bias are never signed.

DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE LITIGATION (*joint with Andres Espitia de la Hoz*)

In collective litigations the outcome of the trial may depend on the number of litigants. In this paper, we study how collectives form and explore actions that the defendant can take to interfere in this process. We propose a dynamic model of litigation in which a defendant faces the arrival of plaintiffs over time and where the defendant is privately informed about the scope of the harm she has caused (e.g. how many consumers have been exposed to a defective product). We show that when all plaintiffs are strategic the defendant can completely avoid the formation of a collective. However, if some plaintiffs (exogenously) join the collective then strategic plaintiffs may also join. We compare the baseline, in which all settlements are public, to a setting where the privacy of settlements is endogenous. We show that use of private settlements can decrease expected payments for some plaintiffs but may increase payments to subsequent ones. The defendant gains on the possibility of settling the case secretly only if the plaintiffs prior about the scope of the harm is low.

TRUST AND NETWORK FORMATION (*(joint with Juan Camilo Cardenas, Davide Pietrobon, Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer and Tatiana Velasco)*

We study how people's propensity to trust affects the social networks they form relying on an empirical strategy that is immune to reverse causality. We use a combination of survey questions and a standard trust experiment to measure the propensity to trust of 72 members of a cohort of first-year undergraduates before they had a chance to meet. After four months, we elicit five different social networks among the students. We estimate social network formation models for each of the networks elicited to identify how the different measures of trust affect link formation. We control for a large set of observables, including many individual and dyadic traits which are known to play a significant role in network formation. We find that trust poorly explains the formation of the networks we retrieve. In particular, the effect of homophily in socioeconomic background can go so far as being one order of magnitude bigger than the effect of trust.